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ABSTRACT

In an effort to determine the nature of American network television news coverage of the Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia, a study examined the television evening news from April 16, 1975, the date on which the Lon Nol government first offered to capitulate to the Khmer Rouge, through January 8, 1979, when news of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese was first reported. The "Television News Index and Abstracts" was used to identify all stories about Cambodia broadcast during the period of interest. Two hundred and forty-two stories about Cambodia were identified and analyzed. Findings showed that (1) overall coverage of Cambodia was at best extremely limited, especially in the three years following June 1975; (2) what coverage there was tended to focus largely on Cambodia's external affairs; (3) the tone of coverage, both in general and that devoted to human rights, changed from relatively balanced in the weeks immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory, to overwhelmingly negative (that is, unfavorable in its depiction of the Khmer Rouge government) for much of the remainder of the study period; (4) the coverage of human rights issues, both negative and positive, external and internal, totalled less than 70 minutes in a period of almost 45 months; (5) this very limited body of coverage was focused primarily on the two issues of unlawful executions and forced migrations; (6) other internal rights issues were largely or completely ignored and (7) almost one-fifth of this coverage, particularly in 1975, was positive in tone. (Fifteen tables of data and two notes are included, and 30 references are appended.) (MS)

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The Killing Fields on TV:

A Critical Analysis of Network Coverage of

Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge

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In recent months, Cambodia has again become the subject of extensive coverage in the American news media. The ostensible stimulus for this renewed interest is the tenth anniversary of the defeat of the Khmer Rouge government by Vietnamese forces and the installation of the present client regime under the nominal leadership of Heng Samrin. Much of this reporting is historical in nature, focusing on the calculated atrocities of the Khmer Rouge reign of terror. But there is a strong prospective dimension as well, occasioned by the impending withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. After their departure, now scheduled for the end of 1990 at the latest, the Heng Samrin government will have to contend for power with a loose coalition of three armed resistance groups. Two of these, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the Sihanoukist National Army, have pledged themselves to democracy; the third is the Khmer Rouge. Well armed, well disciplined, and able to field an army of an estimated 30,000 troops, the Khmer Rouge is by far the strongest of the three. Thus many observers fear there is a real possibility that Cambodia could once again be subjected to Khmer Rouge rule.

This is truly a grim prospect. The Khmer Rouge communists governed Cambodia for less than four years, from April 1975 to January 1979. In that period, they were responsible for almost incalculable suffering among their countrymen. Most estimates place the number of Cambodians who died from execution, overwork, starvation and disease at one to three million out of a population of five to eight million (e.g., Adams and Joblove 1982:217; Kiljunen 1984:ix). A recent editorial in The New Republic provides a succinct summary of their grisly methods ("Stop Pol Pot" 1989:7):

> Pol Pot came to power and unleashed another Holocaust. His Khmer Rouge army massacred a million people, a third [sic] of the population. With a crazed ideology that demanded the almost total destruction of past Khmer civilization, Pol Pot's soldiers killed every high school or college graduate, civil servant, teacher, and priest they could find. For a person to own eyeglasses or a book was to be labeled as an intellectual--the punishment for which was to be clubbed to death. As recounted on a recent NBC documentary, Khmer Rouge soldiers lined up all the young women in one village, singled out the prettiest, and cut off her breasts, forcing villagers at gunpoint to watch her bleed to death.

Unlike certain other national tragedies, knowledge of the Cambodian holocaust has now entered the popular consciousness. This is partly due to the impact of the film The Killing Fields, which received massive acclaim and three 1984 Academy Awards. It is also the product of hundreds of graphic accounts of life under the Khmer Rouge provided by Cambodian refugees and other survivors. Some of the most powerful of these have appeared in book form (e.g., Barron and Paul 1977b; Ponchaud 1978; Anderson and Prozini 1981; May 1986; Szymusiak 1986); others are scattered throughout the print and broadcast media. Finally, there has been a steady stream of anti-Khmer Rouge propaganda produced or fostered by the Heng Samrin government to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

But even given this knowledge, it is difficult to fully comprehend the magnitude of the Cambodian tragedy. One way of conceptualizing the enormous

human suffering involved is suggested by University of Hawaii professor R. J. Rummel in a Wall Street Journal article (1986:18). According to his estimate: "The total number killed in the Vietnam War on all sides was about 1.2 million people." This war, of course, dominated the attention of the American public for nearly a decade, and impassioned pleas to "Stop the killing" eventually forced the withdrawal of American troops. But as Rummel notes, the Khmer Rouge "slaughtered from one to three million Cambodians. If we take two million as the best estimate, then in four years the government of this small nation of seven million alone killed 64% more people than died in the 10-year Vietnam War." Another way of conceptualizing the losses borrows a device used by Conquest (1986:1) in his history of the Soviet "terror-famine" of 1932-33. Even if we accept a conservative estimate of one million Cambodian victims, this means that about twenty human lives were lost for, not every word, but every letter, in the text of this paper.

Given this appalling record of carnage, the desire of contemporary journalists to prevent a recurrence of Khmer Rouge rule by drawing attention to the present situation in Cambodia is fully understandable, even laudable. But it must be stressed that this desire is of relatively recent vintage. However much we now know about the horrors of Khmer Rouge rule, those events received very little attention in the major American news media at the time they took place. This pattern of omission was especially pronounced on network television, cited as the primary source of news by a majority of the American public since the mid-1960s. For example, in a TV Guide article published in April 1977 at the height of the Khmer Rouge atrocities, Ernest Lefever noted (1977:A6):

> In the 20 months following the "liberation" of Cambodia, the ABC, CBS and NBC evening news shows spent a total of four hours and 55 minutes covering Cambodia, but only 7 per cent on the blood bath. The three shows combined gave one minute of news a month to a purge that in terms of relative population exceeded the slaughter of Hitler's and Stalin's concentration camps.

A more extensive study covering the full period of Khmer Rouge rule (Adams and Joblove 1982) produced very similar results. The authors concluded (1982:217):

> No other single episode has involved a greater loss of life during the last quarter century. Yet, despite the barbarism and magnitude of the tragedy, little public attention was directed to Cambodia. It was ignored by the US media, government, and people.
>
> The death toll was at least a thousand times greater than that of the Jonestown murders and suicides, but news coverage of Cambodia was a fraction of that given to Jonestown. Added together over the entire four year Khmer Rouge period, all three television networks [combined] devoted less than 60 minutes on weeknights to the new society and human rights in Cambodia. Nearly three hours were spent detailing the Jonestown deaths in the first

week alone.

If American journalists, who take great pride in their merciless exposure of wrongdoing and corruption by the United States and its allies, had focused the spotlight of world attention on Cambodia in 1975[1], there is a chance the tragedy could have been averted or diminished. Although Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge was perhaps the most the most isolated and xenophobic nation in the world, it was still heavily dependent on aid from its communist allies, especially China. Thus it might have been possible to exert pressure on Cambodia through its benefactors; failing that, perhaps world opinion could have been mobilized to support outside intervention by multinational forces under the aegis of the United Nations. But, for the most part, the spotlight remained unlit, and the Cambodian people suffered and died in obscurity.

This study is part of an attempt to understand why an event of this magnitude could remain all but hidden from public scrutiny during the years in which it unfolded. It is an undertaking fraught with difficulties. As the same New Republic editorial cited above notes ("Stop Pol Pot" 1989:7):

> As reports of the horrors began to trickle in from refugees, they were widely denied or ignored in the United States. Finally, they were accepted, but they then became the occasion not for action of any kind, but for ideological recriminations. The right said this wouldn't have happened if the left had not helped the Communists triumph in Indochina. The left said this wouldn't have happened if the United States had stayed out of Indochina in the first place. The Khmer Rouge catastrophe ended only in 1979 with an invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam--not a mercy mission, but an act of imperialism leading to yet other atrocities, including summary executions, mass jailings, and forced labor.

Our goal, if possible, is to move beyond political recrimination. Certainly there is blame enough for everyone in this situation, if blame be sought. We will focus instead on trying to discover what went wrong in American coverage of Cambodia in the hope that similar failures can be avoided in the future. After all, we are dealing here not merely with political abstractions, but with the lives and fortunes of real human beings. The first step in this process is to determine the precise nature of Cambodian coverage during the period of Khmer Rouge rule. This study, part of a much larger project, examines the coverage provided by network television news. We know from Lefever (1977) and Adams and Joblove (1982) that this medium told us very little about human rights in Cambodia, but neither study was detailed enough to establish exactly what television did tell us about Cambodia, or when. The current project seeks to rectify that deficiency.

Historical Background

Before turning to a description of our research, it will be useful to provide a chronology of events in Cambodia during the period of Khmer Rouge rule. Limitations of space permit only the briefest of accounts; those unfamiliar with the period in question are urged to consult the various

sources cited above, the (somewhat slanted) chronology offered in Ablin and Hood (1987:375-97), or the succinct summary in Kiljunen (1984:11-21).

On April 16, 1975, with Phnom Penh encircled and Khmer Rouge troops reported within 1000 yards of the former American embassy, the American-backed government of Lon Nol (who had already fled the country) sued for peace. The following day, the Khmer Rouge took full control of the capital and organized resistance ceased. Within hours of its victory the new government began emptying Phnom Penh and all other population centers of their inhabitants. Hundreds of foreign nationals, including a number of Western journalists, took refuge in the French embassy. There they remained for several weeks until evacuated by road convoy to Thailand, the second and last of which arrived on May 8.

After May 8, 1975, there was virtually no regular contact between Cambodia and the rest of the world. Its borders were sealed, foreigners (except for Chinese and North Korean advisers) were rigorously excluded, and its sole scheduled international transportation link was a biweekly flight between Phnom Penh and Peking. Thus, for several years, the only source of detailed information about Cambodia available to the West was the steady trickle of refugees reaching Thailand, many the pathetic survivors of much larger groups who had sought to escape.

What we know of Cambodian life during this period is still largely based on the reports of these and later refugees. By all accounts, the victorious Khmer Rouge immediately instituted one of the most radical social transformations in recorded history. Their goal was to create a form of primitive agrarian communism, apparently a literal instantiation of the utopian schemes Khmer Rouge leaders had learned from their Marxist professors in France. To this end, virtually the entire population, including perhaps three million urban residents, was set to tilling the (often virgin) land. All aspects of life were collectivized, and efforts were made to extirpate all vestiges of Western and much of traditional Khmer civilization. Religion, private property, money, most forms of communication, education and medicine, and even the most basic human rights were eliminated; those who resisted (and many who did not) were simply killed, often by the most brutal means.

The initial forced migration to the countryside in April 1975 was followed by a second massive transfer of population at the end of that year. Several years of increasingly serious internal and external strife ensued, from which Pol Pot and his supporters emerged dominant after purging their rivals. In 1977, border clashes with Vietnam escalated into a major conflict when Vietnam launched what it (and many observers) described as a retaliatory strike against Khmer Rouge forces in the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia. The hostility between the two countries--Cambodia the protege of China, Vietnam of the Soviet Union--intensified in 1978. In May, a rebellion by Khmer Rouge cadres in the East zone of Cambodia was brutally suppressed by troops loyal to the central government; survivors were shipped to other parts of the country, where many were murdered. Some, however, escaped to Vietnam, where they were formed into the Kampuchean National United Front of National Salvation which was eventually installed in power by the Vietnamese. Finally, on December 25, 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. On January 7, 1979,

Khmer Rouge forces abandoned Phnom Penh to the invaders and fled west to the jungle retreats along the Thai border which they still hold. The following day, the Vietnamese-backed People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea headed by Heng Samrin took power and the era of Khmer Rouge rule ended.

Many in the West reacted with shock when news of Khmer Rouge aims and methods became known. But, at least in hindsight, there was ample warning of what would occur. Ponchaud (1978) and Rodman (1981), among others, have stressed that the Khmer Rouge followed the same policies in the areas under their control in the years before 1975 as they did after taking power at the national level, including depopulation of urban areas and brutal executions of supposed enemies of the revolution. Certainly American conservatives had long warned of the dire consequences of communist rule. For example, on the day that Phnom Penh fell, a New York Times story quoted a Ford administration description of the Khmer Rouge as "Cruel fanatics who were likely to go on a killing spree, massacring their opponents in Phnom Penh if they took power" (cited in Allen 1986:21).

Nor was there a total lack of information about events inside Cambodia as the tragedy unfolded. Numerous news stories released on and after May 8, 1975, after all foreign nationals were safe in Thailand, gave first-hand accounts of the depopulation of Phnom Penh and other cities, including references to the emptying of hospitals, and many noted widespread rumors of mass executions. On at least two occasions in the period immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory--May 13 and June 24, 1975--Secretary of State Kissinger explicitly condemned the communist atrocities. On the latter date, Freedom House released a statement which compared the actions of the Khmer Rouge to Hitler's extermination of the Jews, and called for international intervention to save the Cambodian people. On July 9, 1975, a biting editorial in the New York Times entitled "Cambodia's Crime" (1975:36) used refugee accounts and intelligence sources to paint a detailed picture of the suffering of the Cambodian people and asked: "What, if anything, can the outside world do to alter the genocidal policies of Cambodia's hard men?" Similar editorials appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the Christian Science Monitor and other newspapers, and detailed accounts of atrocities were carried by nearly all of the major print media over the next two years (e.g., Time's "Khmer Rouge: Rampant Terror" in May 1976, Newsweek's "Horror Stories" in May 1977 and US News and World Report's August 1977 "Communist Solution: Death of a Million").

Coverage reached a peak of intensity in early 1977, with articles by Lefever in TV Guide and by Barron and Paul in Reader's Digest (1977a), and with the release of the latter's stunning book Murder of a Gentle Land (1977b) based on interviews with over 300 Cambodian refugees. On May 3, 1977, a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations held hearings on the subject of human rights in Cambodia (U.S. Congress, House 1977). The year 1977 also saw publication in France of Ponchaud's refugee-based Cambodge annee zero (published in English translation in 1978), which reached conclusions very similar to those of Barron and Paul about conditions in Cambodia. But it was only in 1978 that the scattered accounts began to change to a sustained emphasis in the press. One impetus was President Carter's April 21 characterization of Cambodia as the worst violator of human rights in

the world; another was Senator George McGovern's August 21 call for armed intervention by the international community to stop the slaughter.

Of course, not all coverage of Cambodia in this period was condemnatory. The accounts of many journalists both before and immediately after the communist victory were overtly optimistic, the latter often stressing the enthusiastic welcome accorded the well-disciplined Khmer Rouge troops. For example, a story by Sydney Schanberg in the April 13, 1975, edition of the New York Times appeared under the headline: "Indochina Without Americans: For Most a Better Life." Even as knowledge of the true character of the Cambodian revolution became more widely known, some apologists insisted that all was well. For example, the congressional testimony of Dr. Gareth Porter, an associate of the Institute for Policy Studies and former co-director of the Cornell University Indochina Resource Center, painted such an improbably rosy picture of conditions in Cambodia that Representative Stephen Solarz felt constrained to ask (U.S. Congress, House 1977:43): "This isn't some kind of a put-on where you are playing a role? I mean you actually believe that what you said is true, that it characterizes--[.]" (Many of these apologists are still active [e.g., Shawcross 1979; 1984; Vickery 1984; Herman 1985; 1986] but they now tend to focus less on denying that any excesses took place than on diminishing their significance and offering sympathetic explanations for their occurrence.)

It should also be stressed that while occasional references to events in Cambodia appeared in nearly all of the major American news media at one time or another during the period of Khmer Rouge rule, such accounts were never numerous. This was especially true in the period from about July 1975 through March 1977. For example, an exhaustive study by Allen (1986) of coverage in the New York Times and Washington Post from April 17, 1975, through January 9, 1979, found 145 and 131 articles, respectively, that mentioned human rights violations in Cambodia. But only 24 stories in the Times and 28 in the Post mentioned human rights violations in the 21 months stretching from July 1875 through March 1977.

In short, information about events in Cambodia was far from plentiful, especially in the years 1975-77. But it was available both in the major media and from Cambodian refugees for anyone who took the trouble to seek it out. It is against this background that the adequacy of television coverage should be judged.

Method

The purpose of this study was to determine the nature of coverage of Cambodia on network television evening news from April 16, 1975, the date on which the Lon Nol government first offered to capitulate to the Khmer Rouge, through January 8, 1979, when news of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese was first reported. The data base was assembled by using the Television News Index and Abstracts to identify all stories about Cambodia broadcast during the period of interest and held in the collection of the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. This collection includes all weeknight and weekend newscasts broadcast in Nashville, Tennessee, during the period of study, supplemented since 1978 by weekend newscasts broadcast in Washington, D.C., but not in Nashville. It therefore seems likely that the collection includes all or

nearly all of the coverage of Cambodia during the period of interest; regardless, it is the most comprehensive data base available for research. Once identified, videotape recordings of all 242 stories about Cambodia were obtained from the Archive and subjected to extensive analysis[8].

Data analysis followed a four-step process. First, relevant coding categories and recording instructions were developed. These are described in detail in the following section. Second, a sample of stories was coded and categories and instructions were revised as needed. Third, each of the authors coded all of the stories about Cambodia using the revised categories and instructions. Finally, the two sets of data generated in the third step were compared and all discrepancies were noted. Each discrepancy was then discussed by the authors and a final coding decision was made by consensus.

Coding of data by the researchers, the procedure used in this study, has been attacked by Krippendorff (1980:74) as "probably the worst practice in content analysis" on the grounds that it prevents independent reliability checks and produces unreplicable results. He suggests using "independent" coders who are trained by working through a standard sample of material, comparing their results at each step with "ostensibly correct results" as determined by a "panel of experts" (presumably the researchers). Individuals who are not "suitable" for the task are then eliminated.

Although Krippendorff's concern for reliability and replicability is laudable, it is difficult to see how the reliability checks generated by this or any other extensive training procedure are "independent" in any meaningful sense of the term. Further, to the extent that trained coders are less "expert" than the researchers who trained them, validity is diminished. Finally, successful replication depends less on who codes the data than on the clarity and completeness of the category systems and coding instructions. This study was designed with these considerations in mind. Every effort was made to insure that the results would be valid, reliable and replicable. In deference to established usage, however, it is perhaps better described as a critical analysis than as a "scientific" content analysis.

Results

Each story in the data base was coded for a number of content dimensions. The results of this process are reported in Tables 1-15 and described in this section. Given limitations of space and time, only the most salient findings will be noted here.

Amount of coverage. Tables 1-3 report the findings of various measures of the amount of Cambodian coverage. Table 1 shows the total number of stories containing any mention of Cambodian affairs and the amount of time that those stories occupied in the evening newscasts. Time data were computed from the clock readings shown on the Vanderbilt tapes and are accurate to within ten seconds.

In all, the networks broadcast 242 stories about Cambodia in the period of study, a total of well over eight hours of coverage (512:50 minutes). These stories were distributed fairly evenly across the networks, although total coverage was somewhat greater on CBS (92 stories, 193:20 minutes) than

on ABC (75 stories, 162:20 minutes) and NBC (75 stories, 157:00 minutes). There were marked differences, however, in the amount of coverage over time. Well over half of all coverage of Cambodia (61.4%) took place in the less than months of 1975 covered in this study, and of this nearly all appeared during the period of April 16 through June 30. As shown by the annual columns in Table 1, coverage dropped to about 44 minutes (17 stories) in 1976 and then to a low of less than 17 minutes (15 stories) in 1977, before rebounding to 80 minutes in 1978 and 56 minutes in the first eight days of 1979. Significantly, this pattern of coverage was highly consistent across all three networks. It means that in the 30-month period from July 1975 through December 1977, there was very little Cambodian coverage of any kind on network television news.

Several additional analyses show that coverage of the situation within Cambodia was actually substantially less than the above figures would indicate. First, on May 12, 1975, Khmer Rouge forces seized the American cargo ship Mayaguez in international waters off the Cambodian coast and imprisoned its crew. This act and the ensuing American military rescue operation generated extensive coverage on network news. Stories dealing exclusively with this incident or its aftermath are identified separately in Table 1 under the heading of "Mayaguez only." Inspection of the annual columns in Table 1 shows that the Mayaguez incident dominated coverage of Cambodia in 1975 (56.8% of total time) and 1976 (53.6% of total time). Indeed, if Mayaguez stories are excluded, the three networks combined offered only 9 stories comprising a little over 19 minutes of air time to other Cambodian affairs in all of 1976; NBC offered no other coverage of Cambodia in that year.

Second, it should be recognized that a story which mentions Cambodia may not be devoted exclusively to coverage of Cambodian affairs. Accordingly, each story was categorized on the basis of the amount of Cambodian material it contains. In a "mention" story, less than 10% of total content (often only a passing reference) deals with Cambodia. A "theme" story contains 10 to 50% Cambodian material, while a "focus" story includes more than 50%. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2. It shows that 22.7% (55 of 242) of all Cambodian stories, comprising 27% (138:20 of 512:50 minutes) of total coverage time, contained less than half Cambodian material. Only 187 stories comprising about six and a quarter hours of air time were predominantly concerned with Cambodian affairs. This pattern was especially marked in 1976, when mention and theme stories accounted for 41.1% (7 of 17) of all stories and 59.7% (26:10 of 43:50 minutes) of all air time devoted to Cambodia. Thus, in 1976 as in 1977, actual coverage of Cambodian affairs was extremely limited.

A third restriction concerns the general content focus of the coverage. Each story was coded for the presence of three types of information. Information about events within Cambodia or the policies of the Khmer Rouge government was listed as coverage of "internal affairs." Information about Cambodian refugees outside their homeland was designated as "refugee" material. Information concerning the reactions of other countries to Cambodian affairs, but which made no reference to internal events or policies, was coded under the heading of "external issues." In practice, this category was used most often to cover American discussion of the Mayaguez incident,

especially the extended debate about the propriety of American military intervention. The "internal affairs" category was used as the residual for this analysis and multiple coding was permitted. The latter policy reflects the fact that a given story could contain two or three types of information.

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3. Perhaps the most important finding is that only 171 stories (70.7% of the total) contained any information at all about Cambodian internal affairs. But this proportion varied markedly by year. In 1975, reflecting the dominance of the Mayaguez incident, only 59.6% of all stories mentioned internal affairs. This figure dropped to 47.1% in 1976, a finding that reinforces the conclusion that there was very little coverage of the plight of the Cambodian people in that year. In 1977-79, however, nearly all stories contained at least some information about internal events and policies. It is also interesting to note that only 40 stories included any mention of Cambodian refugees. Of these, only 15 appeared in the period 1976-79. Among other things, this means that the networks made very little use of refugees as a source of information about events within their homeland.

Evaluative tone of the coverage. The next stage of the analysis sought to establish the evaluative tone of the coverage. Four categories were used for this purpose: positive, negative, mixed and neutral. The positive and negative categories were reserved for those instances where a story was completely or overwhelmingly favorable or unfavorable in its depiction of the Khmer Rouge government or its policies. Stories which contained both favorable and unfavorable material were coded as "mixed." Those which merely reported events without any explicit or implicit evaluation, and those which included only passing evaluative references or implications, were coded as "neutral." Thus the "mixed" and "neutral" categories served as residuals for the analysis.

Any attempt to establish the valence of content necessarily involves a degree of subjective judgment. In practice, however, we agreed quite closely in our coding decisions. The few cases of disagreement were resolved by assigning the stories in question to the appropriate residual categories. Thus we feel confident that the results of this analysis provide at least a rough indication of the overall tone of coverage.

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. It shows that coverage of the Khmer Rouge government and its policies was predominantly negative across the full period of study. Of the 242 stories, 179 (74%) contained at least some substantial amount of evaluative material. Of these, 98 were negative, 22 positive and 59 mixed. Thus negative stories outweighed positive by a ratio of well over 4 to 1. Further, there was a remarkable degree of similarity in the valence of coverage across the three networks. The ratio of negative to positive stories ranged only from 4.1 to 1 on NBC to 5.0 to 1 on ABC.

However, close inspection of Table 4 reveals several interesting variations by content and year. In 1975, the number of negative stories (55) exceeded the number of positive stories (15) by a ratio of almost 4 to 1. But of the 55 negative stories, 39 (70.9%) dealt solely with the Mayaguez

incident. If these are excluded, the remaining coverage is almost perfectly balanced in tone, with 15 positive stories and 16 negative. This reflects the generally favorable coverage of the Khmer Rouge in the weeks immediately following the fall of Phnom Penh and the relative dearth of stories in the second half of the year, when knowledge of Khmer Rouge atrocities became available.

In the period 1976-78, the coverage, while limited in scope, became overwhelmingly negative in tone. Over these three years, 36 stories were negative, while only 3 were positive, a ratio of precisely 12 to 1. Further, the pattern was highly consistent across all three networks. This finding is highly significant, for it suggests that, unlike the period immediately after the fall of the Lon Nol government, by 1976 journalists were well aware of the character of the Khmer Rouge government. Knowing this, they still withheld substantial coverage. Only in the first eight days of 1979 did coverage become more favorable, with the appearance of 4 predominantly positive stories. These reflect a certain limited sympathy for the plight of the Khmer Rouge government in light of the Vietnamese invasion. But even in this period, negative stories outnumbered positive by almost a 2 to 1 ratio.

Content themes. The next stage of the study sought to determine the general content of coverage about Cambodia. Accordingly, all discussion of Cambodia in the 242 stories in the study was coded into the 18 major categories shown in Table 5. Because of its significance, the "military affairs" category was subdivided into the three more specific subcategories of civil (i.e., internal) conflict, foreign conflict and routine military activities. The "Other" category was used primarily to designate general comments about Cambodia, but also served as the residual for the analysis. All information about human rights violations was categorized according to content area. For example, discussions of mass executions were coded under the "Law/Justice/Crime" category and comments about starvation were coded under the "Food and Agriculture" category. The analysis reported here was exhaustive, in the sense that all statements about Cambodia were assigned to one or more content categories. For the sake of simplicity, however, Table 5 reports only the number of stories containing any information about each of the content categories; it does not reflect the amount of information about a given category in any particular story.

Several important conclusions are suggested by the findings reported in Table 5. First, inspection of the summary column shows that nearly all aspects of Cambodian society received at least some attention during the period of study. However, second, it is clear that information about military affairs dominated coverage, appearing in 172 of the 242 stories (71.1%). Further, 138 of these stories--more than half of the total--dealt with foreign conflicts, most of them between Cambodia and the United States (especially the Mayaguez incident) and her neighbors (primarily Thailand and Vietnam).

In conjunction with the strong stress on foreign affairs (95 of 242 stories), this shows that coverage focused primarily on Cambodia's external relations rather than internal affairs including human rights. Indeed, only four internal topics received substantial coverage: immigration/emigration" (51 stories, most about refugees), law/justice/crime (48 stories, most

concerning human rights violations), history and culture (47 stories, mostly brief references to conditions in pre-war Cambodia), and government and politics (42 stories, primarily concerning the policies and composition of the Khmer Rouge government).

Finally, it is worth noting that the distribution of coverage of the various topics is very similar across all networks (especially if it is computed as a proportion of total coverage within each network, thus eliminating differences in total amount of coverage). This suggests, and detailed examination of the stories confirms, that network reporting was predominantly reactive, in the sense that it consisted largely of coverage of major events as they occurred. There were relatively few feature or background stories overall, and only a handful of investigative stories on topics such as human rights undertaken on the network's initiative. This also suggests extensive similarity in editorial judgment across the three networks.

Conflict coverage. Because conflict, both civil and foreign, was such a prominent feature of total network coverage, two additional analyses were performed on stories in these subcategories. The results are reported in Table 6. The first analysis, shown in the top half of the table, examined the range of Cambodia's adversaries across the period of study. For this analysis, every discussion of conflict was coded and counted separately. Thus, in theory, a given story could include multiple discussions of both civil and foreign conflict. In all, a total of 226 discussions were identified.

The results reflect marked differences over time. In 1975, coverage focused primarily on conflict with the United States (mostly over the Mayaguez incident) and on the civil strife between the Khmer Rouge and the doomed Lon Nol government. In 1976, little conflict was reported. In 1977, coverage focused on conflict with Thailand. This took the form of several brutal raids on Thai villages, presumably carried out by Khmer Rouge troops. In 1978-79, the locus of conflict shifted to Vietnam. This reflects both the Vietnamese invasion and a series of successful Vietnamese propaganda exercises before the invasion, in which Western journalists were taken to the border with Cambodia and shown the results of alleged Khmer Rouge raids.

The bottom half of Table 6 shows the attribution of blame for the various conflicts in which Cambodia was involved. In a majority of cases (130 of 226, or 53.7%), no clear blame was assigned. Of the remaining 96 cases, however, Cambodia was by far the most frequently mentioned culprit, receiving blame for the conflict in 72 discussions. This reflects two areas of culpability. First, many stories about civil conflict attributed blame to one or another of the Cambodian factions; a few blamed civil conflicts on outside countries such as the United States (in 1975) and Vietnam (in later years). The remainder held Cambodia responsible for various foreign conflicts, including the Mayaguez incident with the United States and various raids and battles involving Thailand and Vietnam.

The only other country named with any frequency in the discussions was Vietnam. On 14 occasions, 13 in 1978-79, it was blamed for conflicts with Cambodia. This is an extremely significant finding. After all, Vietnam did

invade and subjugate Cambodia, replacing the existing government with one of its own choosing. Yet in 72 discussion of conflict between the two countries in 1978-79, only 13 (18.1%) placed responsibility for the conflict on Vietnam. This is an extremely small price to pay for what the moderately liberal New Republic has called, in the editorial cited above, "an act of imperialism." This tendency was especially pronounced on NBC. For example, during the invasion and fall of Cambodia in 1979, Cambodia was blamed for civil and foreign conflicts (all related to the invasion) on nine separate occasions, Vietnam on none. (NBC was also more likely to repeat without challenge the Vietnamese propaganda claim that the invasion was actually conducted by Cambodian refugee troops with Vietnamese assistance.)

Human rights coverage. The primary purpose of the study was to determine the precise amount and character of coverage of human rights issues in Cambodia. To this end, several analyses were conducted of stories containing any information about human rights. The results of this part of the study are reported in Tables 7-14.

Table 7 reports the total amount of coverage devoted to discussion of human rights issues in Cambodia during the entire period of Khmer Rouge rule. It was constructed by reviewing all 242 stories and noting those which included any mention of human rights issues, either positive (i.e., progress in achieving human rights) or negative (violations of human rights). For purposes of this and subsequent analyses, human rights were equated with those listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by the United Nations. Although not endorsed by Marxist countries, this document provides a detailed statement of rights that is widely accepted in the United States and other Western countries and seems particularly appropriate for use in evaluating the coverage provided by American journalists. Those stories containing any mention of human rights were then subjected to more detailed analyses. The first of these was a determination of the actual amount of time devoted to discussion of human rights issues in each story.

As shown in the summary column of Table 7, only 74 of the 242 stories (30.6%) broadcast over a period of almost 45 months contained any mention of human rights issues. This represents, in all, only a little over an hour of coverage (69:50 minutes) of this topic. (Note that because this is a more precise measure of coverage time it would be misleading to compare it directly to other estimates of time such as those reported in Tables 1 and 2.) The final column of Table 7 also shows that there was relatively little variation in the amount of human rights coverage across the three networks. The number of stories ranged from 19 (ABC) to 28 (CBS) and the amount of time from 19:00 minutes (ABC) to 30:10 minutes (CBS). By any standard, this is an exceptionally limited amount of coverage for events of the magnitude of those that occurred in Cambodia.

Further examination of Table 7 shows marked variations in coverage by year. Most human rights stories were concentrated in 1975 and 1978. In 1976, there was a total of only seven minutes of coverage of human rights. ABC devoted only one story to the topic and that was less than two minutes in length; NBC provided no coverage whatsoever. In 1977, there was slightly less than seven minutes of total coverage. ABC aired only a single one-minute

story about human rights; CBS broadcast five, but they added up to only 90 seconds in length. And this was the year in which major articles about the Cambodian holocaust appeared in Reader's Digest and TV Guide (which explicitly criticized the networks for ignoring the story) and in which congressional hearings on the issue were held.

Yet even these figures somewhat overestimate the amount of coverage devoted to the human tragedy unfolding in Cambodia. For one thing, the figures in Table 7 reflect all discussions of human rights issues, both negative and positive. We will return to this matter in the discussion of Tables 13 and 14 below. Further, the summary figures discussed so far include coverage of Khmer Rouge actions outside Cambodia as well as inside. In particular, a number of stories reported attacks by Khmer Rouge troops on helpless Thai and Vietnamese civilians. These references were coded as human rights violations. Therefore, in order to get a more accurate picture of the coverage, references to human rights were subdivided into "internal" and "external" subcategories to reflect the distinction between discussions of human rights within Cambodia and outside its borders. The results of this analysis are also reported in Table 7. They show that total discussion of human rights issues within Cambodia comprised only 63 stories and just under one hour of coverage (59:50 minutes), for an average of about 27 seconds of coverage per network per month over the entire period. In 1977, coverage of internal human rights issues totalled only four and one-half minutes across the three networks combined.

Tables 8-11 provide a more detailed account of the distribution of internal and external human rights coverage over the entire period of study. Table 8 reports monthly totals of human rights coverage on ABC. It shows that significant coverage of this topic effectively ceased after May 1975. Gaps of four or more months between human rights stories are common. Only two stories in the entire period (on May 5, 1975, and August 21, 1978) exceeded two minutes in length. If we restrict our focus to internal rights coverage, the picture is even worse. The one-minute stories in February 1977 and February 1978 both dealt exclusively with external rights violations occasioned by alleged Khmer Rouge attacks on villages in Thailand and Vietnam, respectively. Thus, for a period of over two years (from April 12, 1976, to April 21, 1978) ABC devoted no coverage at all to human rights issues within Cambodia.

Table 9 reports very similar findings for CBS. Once again, significant coverage ceased after May 1975 and gaps of six or more months are common. And once again, if we restrict our focus to internal rights coverage the picture worsens. Specifically, the stories in January, July and August, 1977, all dealt with external rights violations. Thus CBS devoted no coverage whatsoever to human rights in Cambodia in the 14-month period from July 9, 1978, to September 5, 1977. In the latter month, two very brief stories discussed unsubstantiated reports of hundreds of thousands of deaths in Cambodia, but then dropped all coverage of human rights in Cambodia for over four months. By then (January 18, 1978), the CBS estimate had grown to "maybe" one million deaths.

Table 10 reports the distribution of rights coverage on NBC. It shows that coverage ceased in July 1975, somewhat later on NBC than on the other

networks. But the elimination was almost total. In the 21 months from July 20, 1975, to April 19, 1977, NBC broadcast only a single 10-second story on human rights, and that dealt exclusively with an external violation. This was followed by further gaps in coverage of four months (April to August 1977) and, because the January 1978 story dealt solely with external rights, of eight months (August 1977 through April 1978). The latter is especially puzzling in light of the fact that the story on August 16, 1977, included a refugee's estimate of a death toll of 2-3 million people.

Table 11 combines the data from the individual networks to report the distribution of all rights coverage on television news. As would be expected, it shows numerous periods of two or more months where there was no coverage of human rights issues--internal or external--on any of the networks. These periods of silence were especially lengthy in 1976-77. From July 1976 to August 1977, a period of 13 months, the total coverage of human rights issues within Cambodia consisted of a single 40-second story on NBC (April 19, 1977); in the nine months preceding that story, there was no coverage at all. Surprisingly, given the fact that Cambodia had figured so prominently in the national debate about the Vietnam war, and had been the recipient of billions of dollars in U.S. aid, the networks even largely ignored the anniversaries of the Khmer Rouge victory. In 1976, neither CBS nor NBC provided any anniversary coverage; ABC broadcast a single 190-second story, of which 110 seconds was devoted to a mixed discussion of human rights progress and violations in Cambodia. In 1977, the only anniversary coverage was a 40-second story on NBC which offered another mixed evaluation of human rights issues.

It must be stressed that the dearth of internal human rights coverage cannot be traced to ignorance of the possibility that large-scale violations were occurring. Among other indications, all three networks provided brief reports of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's atrocity charges of June 24, 1975; the CBS story on that date also reported the Freedom House comparison of the slaughter in Cambodia to the Nazi Holocaust. Nor is it easy to attribute their silence to a lack of reliable information. For example, in a story on July 12, 1975, NBC correspondent Barry Kalb recited a series of refugee accounts of mass executions and other now-familiar atrocities, and then concluded: "When stories like this began to filter out about a month ago, people were initially skeptical. But now they're saying too many people are telling the same story; it must be true." CBS reporter Peter Collins reached a very similar conclusion six months later. In a story from the Thai-Cambodian border broadcast on January 26, 1976, he also narrated a series of refugee accounts (including the only mention on network television of the second forced migration within Cambodia) and then offered this judgment: "Since the fall of Phnom Penh last year, no Westerner or journalist has gone into Cambodia to verify the tales of horror brought out by the refugees. But their accounts of life across this border are so numerous and so detailed there seems little doubt that the new communist regime is continuing its harsh reform of Cambodia under what the refugees describe as a reign of terror." Sadly, after reaching these conclusions, both networks lapsed into near-total silence on human rights issues. NBC aired one 20-second report on July 20, 1975, and then ceased coverage of the topic for 21 months; CBS broadcast only one other story about rights violations within Cambodia (on July 9, 1976) in

the next 20 months. We will return to these findings below.

The next analysis sought to determine the kinds of human rights issues discussed in network coverage of Cambodia. Accordingly, each mention of human rights was assigned to one of 23 categories, 22 of them specific and one general. The specific categories correspond to the various articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the general category was used to classify nonspecific human rights references (e.g., the passing description of the Khmer Rouge government as a "brutal regime) and also served as the residual category for the analysis. All mentions of human rights, 292 in all, both positive and negative, were coded.

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 12. It shows that only two specific human rights issues dominated coverage of the topic. These are the right to life, mentioned in 85 (29.1%) of the 292 references, and freedom of movement and residence, mentioned 67 times (22.9% of the total). These findings reflect preoccupations in the coverage with the possibility of mass executions and about the forced migrations of population groups within Cambodia, especially the depopulation of the cities in April of 1975. Other rights categories received little coverage. In particular, although hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Cambodians died of starvation and disease in this period, these issues were mentioned (either positively or negatively) in network coverage on only 20 and 12 occasions, respectively. General references to human rights issues made up approximately one sixth of the total (46 of 292). Thus coverage of human rights issues was limited not only in amount but in scope as well.

The next analysis established the force and valence of human rights statements in network coverage of Cambodia. Discussion of human rights was reduced to a total of 194 separate statements (a number of which mentioned more than one rights issue). Each statement was then assigned to one of four categories according to whether it claimed or denied that a human rights violation had occurred, or whether it claimed or denied the progress in human rights had been achieved. Two of these categories--"Violation claimed" and "Progress rebutted"--reflect negatively on the Khmer Rouge government; the other two--"Violation rebutted" and "Progress claimed"--reflect positively. These categories are grouped accordingly in Table 13. In addition, each statement was coded to reflect whether it asserted the definite existence of a state of affairs (e.g., "Reports from Thailand today say that more than 200 Cambodian refugees were killed . . . .") or merely suggested the possibility or probability that a state of affairs might exist (e.g., "Unconfirmed rumors from Cambodian refugees say that thousands are dying of hunger . . . .).

The results of this analysis are reported in Table 13. Inspection of the summary column shows that overall coverage of human rights in Cambodia was predominantly unfavorable, with negative statements outnumbering positive by a ratio of 4.5 to 1 (159 to 35) across all networks. It should be noted, however, that 18% of the statements were positive (35 of 194). There was also substantial variation across networks and years. On ABC, coverage was only 2 to 1 negative (32 to 16), on CBS the ratio was 5.5 to 1 (71 to 13), while on NBC it reached a high of 9.3 to 1 (56 to 6).

These variations are largely the result of differences in coverage in 1975. In that year, ABC's coverage was almost perfectly balanced, with 16 negative and 15 positive statements. Indeed, if we restrict our attention only to those claims that were definitely asserted, positive outnumber negative by a margin of 11 to 10. On CBS, the overall margin was 19 to 7 negative; on NBC, 18 to 5. It should be noted, however, that while most statements in 1975 were negative, almost half of the negative statements were suggested (25 of 53) rather than asserted (28 of 53). In contrast, almost 70% of the positive statements (18 of 26) were definitely asserted.

Both the force and valence of human rights statements changed dramatically after 1975. In the last four years of the study period, almost 80% of the rights statements (90 of 115) were asserted rather than suggested. They were also overwhelmingly unfavorable in tone, with negative statements outnumbering positive by a margin of 106 to 9 across all three networks. Only on CBS in 1978 was there any significant positive coverage. Once again, and in conjunction with the distribution of human rights coverage reported in Tables 7-11, this strongly suggests that network journalists were well aware of the true conditions in Cambodia by mid-1975 at the latest.

The final analysis in this section of the study examined the sources of human rights statements in coverage of Cambodia. Each of the 194 negative and positive rights statements was assigned to one of eleven categories on the basis of the source of the information it presented. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 14. Inspection of the top half of the table shows that journalists were by far the greatest single source of negative statements about human rights, accounting for 75 of the 159 statements. Refugees were the source of 29 negative statements, U.S. and other foreign officials of 28. This also suggests that journalists were well aware of conditions in Cambodia throughout most of the period of study. On the other hand, inspection of the bottom half of Table 14 shows that journalists were the source of more than half (18 of 35) of all of the positive statements about human rights in Cambodia, doubling the total of 9 statements from the Khmer Rouge government itself. This shows that while network journalists were that government's greatest critics on human rights issues, they were also its greatest apologists.

Video content. The last and simplest analysis in the study sought to determine the degree to which coverage of Cambodia included film or video material from within Cambodia. Accordingly, each story was coded for the presence or absence of Cambodian footage (or photographs). The results of this analysis are reported in Table 15. It shows that of the 242 Cambodian stories, only 34 (14%) included any visual material about Cambodia. Even in 1975, only 11% of all stories (16 of 141) included such material. In all years of the study, much of what little footage that did exist consisted of nothing more than a video shot from the Thai or Vietnamese border into Cambodia. Thus, at no time did video material play a significant role in television coverage of Cambodia during the period of Khmer Rouge rule. We will return to this point in the final section.

Discussion

This paper has reported the results of a detailed analysis of network television news coverage of Cambodia during the period of Khmer Rouge rule. We have shown that overall coverage of Cambodia was at best extremely limited, especially in the three years following June of 1975. What coverage there was tended to focus largely on Cambodia's external affairs, in particular its conflicts with the United States, Thailand and Vietnam, for which it was assigned much of the blame. The tone of coverage, both in general and that devoted to human rights, changed from relatively balanced in the weeks immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory, to overwhelmingly negative for much of the remainder of the study period. Coverage of human rights issues, both negative and positive, external and internal, totalled less than 70 minutes in a period of almost 45 months. This very limited body of coverage was focused primarily on the two issues of unlawful executions and forced migrations; other internal rights issues were largely or completely ignored. Almost one-fifth of this coverage, most from 1975, was positive in tone. Journalists emerged as the greatest critics and defenders of the Khmer Rouge government and its policies.

By almost any conceivable standard, network television coverage of Cambodia in this period was woefully inadequate. The next problem is to determine why this was so. Unfortunately, there can be no easy or complete answer to this question. Television news is the product of human action, and human action seldom results from a single cause. Nor are journalists a monolithic group. Different individuals acted, no doubt, from somewhat different sets of motives. Finally, the methods used in this study can provide no definitive evidence of what those motives were. Only the journalists themselves can know for sure.

But while we cannot fully resolve this question, we are in a position to evaluate the validity of some of the reasons offered for the pattern of coverage discovered in this and similar studies. And it is worth noting that the similarities in coverage across the three networks (and across most of the major print media as well) are so great that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some common factors must be at work. We turn to that task next.

There are at least seven major reasons why network television news provided so little coverage of the Cambodian holocaust. The first, that television journalists were unaware of what was taking place, has already been refuted. All three networks were alerted to the situation by their coverage of Dr. Kissinger's allegations on June 24, 1975, and CBS and NBC at least were able to confirm his claims in subsequent stories of their own. The second possible reason is that constraints of money or newstime precluded fuller coverage. But this explanation is no more credible than the first. After all, we are dealing here with the death of a million or more people, the calculated destruction of an entire culture, and one that was once our ally. If this is not newsworthy enough to support a claim on scarce journalistic resources, it is difficult to imagine what might be.

A third reason was offered by ABC News editor Mary Fifield in a letter to Policy Review, where the first version of the Adams and Joblove study

appeared. In it she notes (1980:3) "the elemental explanation for the difficulties the U.S. television networks faced in covering the devastation in Cambodia: we could not get into the country." Further, "Since we were not able to gain entrance to Cambodia, there was no way television news could show the actual tragedy." In short, since television could not show the atrocities, it could not cover them. This is, of course, patently absurd. For one thing, only 34 of the 242 stories about Cambodia, and virtually none of the stories on internal human rights, included any visual material from within Cambodia. If the networks could show 208 stories without such material, why not more? More generally, some of the most heavily covered stories in the history of television news (e.g., Watergate, the Iran hostages, the Iran-Contra affair) included very little dramatic footage, yet this deficiency did not preclude their coverage. Finally, anyone who has seen some of the deeply touching interviews with Cambodian refugees is well aware that those stories can provide both high drama and sustained visual interest. Certainly the networks have relied quite heavily on them in recent months. Nevertheless, however absurd it may be, it is possible that network journalists such as Mary Fifield actually predicated their coverage of Cambodia on such beliefs. If so, they have an absolute obligation to inform the public that they intend to cover only those issues where they can actually show the viewer the events in question.

A fourth reason has been suggested by Adams and Joblove. They argue (1982:224):

> One other explanation for the lack of concern with Cambodia is that television caricatures the front page of the prestige press. Assignment editors rely heavily on the New York Times, Washington Post, and wire services to set the network agenda. . . . While this explanation begs the question of Post and Times coverage, it does help account for television's pattern. In fact, until mid-1978, the Times and Post gave very little space to events in Cambodia.

The major problem with this argument is that it relies on two questionable premises. For one thing, it is unclear to what degree network coverage "caricatures the front page of the prestige press." Granted that this may be one important source of the network agenda, Adams and Joblove offer no reason to believe it is the only one. More important, Allen (1986) has shown conclusively that coverage of Cambodian human rights in these newspapers, while far from massive or sustained, was more than "very little." Specifically, she found (1986:55-59) that human rights in Cambodia were discussed in 108 stories in the New York Times, and 100 stories in the Washington Post, in the period from April 17, 1975, through June 30, 1978. Of course, it may be that the relative lack of emphasis on Cambodia in the prestige press had some influence on the editorial decisions of network journalists. But this provides, at best, only a partial explanation for their decisions, and it cannot serve as a justification for them. More important, as Adams and Joblove suggest, it merely expands responsibility for the failure to the major print media as well. The question, then, is not what went wrong with television news, but with elite journalism as a whole.

The fifth possible reason, also suggested by Adams and Joblove (1982:224), is what they term "the strange silence from the White House." As they point out:

> Neither Carter nor Ford directed any sustained attention to events under the Khmer Rouge. Both administrations engaged in the ritual of an annual condemnation of the regime, but little more--no major diplomatic offenses, no continual publicity efforts, no stream of speeches, and no public debate over more overt moves. With little but token gestures from the President, at least one major factor that would promote network coverage of the subject was absent.

There is an important element of truth in this argument. Both administrations were aware of the situation in Cambodia and so must share some of the blame for failing to bring it to the attention of the American public and the world. But it should be noted in their defense that because the events in Cambodia tended to contradict what Adams and Joblove (1982:222) have called the "supposed Lessons of Vietnam," both presidents faced different but equally grave political risks in emphasizing the issue. More important, the efforts that were made received very little attention from the press. For example, Dr. Kissinger's statement of June 24, 1975, while covered by all three networks, still received a total of only 60 seconds of newstime. Or again, the various congressional hearings and resolutions on the topic were completely ignored by network television until August 21, 1978, when Senator George McGovern, the premier Vietnam "dove," issued a plea for international armed intervention. Finally, this argument asks us to accept an unjustifiably passive view of journalists. Since when have network newsmen needed to be goaded by the political establishment to cover a story of this magnitude?

The sixth reason may bring us much closer to the crux of the issue. An additional explanation offered by ABC's Mary Fifield (1980:3) is that while "there were refugees in camps along the Thai border who were willing to describe the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge, some reporters and editors were reluctant to use their stories because they were not always completely reliable." Now it may very well be true that the decisions of "some reporters and editors" were motivated by these concerns. If so, they should be sacked, because their behavior was unreasonable in at least three senses. First, complete reliability is a ridiculously stringent standard, and one that is seldom if ever used in other areas of reporting. Second, there was very good reason to believe that the reports of the refugees were accurate. To begin with, it is difficult to fault the argument that when large numbers of refugees in widely separated camps tell very detailed and very similar stories, there must be some element of truth in what they say. And certainly at least some editors and reporters at nearly all of the major news media found them credible. More important, the refugee claims were confirmed by government officials of both parties and, as noted in the January 26, 1976, report on CBS, the intelligence community. All of this would suggest to any reasonable person that there was at least some substantial <u>probability</u> that the claims were true. This, in turn, suggests a third

consideration.

In this situation an editor or reporter must weigh two possibilities. If he suppresses the reports and they are true, people will die who might possibly have been saved; if he publishes the reports and they are false, Cambodia and its supporters will be slandered. In the former case, the damage is irreversible. In the latter case, by contrast, the damage is easily repaired. All the Cambodian government must do to prove its innocence is open its borders to neutral observers. Thus it is very difficult to imagine why a reasonable person would not prefer the former risk to the latter. Indeed, the choice is so obvious that it suggests that emotion, not reason, was the determining factor: Journalists failed to emphasize the events in Cambodia because they did not want to emphasize them. The question then is why they would not want to cover human rights abuses in Cambodia.

One obvious possibility is ideology. There is no longer any real doubt that elite journalists are overwhelmingly liberal in their political sentiments (see, e.g., the numerous polls arrayed in Lichter, Rothman and Lichter 1986:39-43). The main point of contention is whether those sentiments affect the content of the news. In the case of Vietnam and Cambodia, it is almost an article of faith among conservatives that coverage in the major media, especially network television after the beginning of the Tet offensive in 1968, displayed a clear antiwar bias, and they can offer at least some systematic evidence in support of their case (e.g., Lefever 1974; Braestrup 1977; Herz 1980). They can also point to the claims of journalists such as Anthony Lewis and Walter Cronkite, who boast proudly of their influence in ending what they saw as an unjust war.

Many who opposed American participation in the Vietnam war shared the strong conviction--or at least the fervent hope--that a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia would bring peace and justice to a gentle land long-ravaged by a conflict forced upon it by outside forces and interests. For them, the reality of Khmer Rouge rule must have been the cruelest of disappointments, and one not easy to accept. It seems likely that at least some network journalists, perhaps many, were members of this group. After all, we do know that in one random sample of national journalists, 81% reported voting for antiwar candidate George McGovern in 1972 (Lichter, Rothman and Lichter 1986:Ch. 2). For them, it would be only human to want to avoid covering that which they had hoped and perhaps believed would never happen.

We cannot, of course, offer any definitive proof for this seventh explanation. At best, it has the force of mere plausibility. But it can account for what we know of coverage of Cambodia. And if it is true, it strikes at the core values of contemporary journalism.

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ENDNOTES

1. It should be noted that there is some disagreement about the amount of coverage devoted to Cambodia during this period. A recent study by Herman (1985:138-39) applies a "propaganda framework" to media coverage of international affairs to hypothesize: ". . . we would forecast that assiduous attention and great indignation would be displayed in the mass media toward Cambodia, as the perpetrators of violence were Communists and benefits could be derived by focusing on their misbehavior." He then concludes (1985:139): "The patterns of coverage bore out these expectations. Although nothing useful was actually done or even proposed to help the Cambodian victims during 1975-1978, the sheer volume and intensity of media coverage of this suffering served as effective propaganda--a Communist victory was shown to have resulted in human disaster (for a full discussion see [Chomsky and Herman 1979]." Challenged by Adams (1986:189) about the validity of his characterizations of the amount of media coverage, Herman responded (1986:190) by citing two books, perhaps a dozen or so articles (Herman is not precise in his figures) in Reader's Digest, TV Guide, Time, Newsweek, New Republic, U.S. News and World Report and the New York Review of Books, plus, in the New York Times, "6 editorials on the subject, 44 news articles (including 7 on the front page),

and 2 Sunday Magazine articles; it also reviewed prominently and favorably Barron-Paul and Ponchaud's Cambodia Year Zero." As for Adams' claim (1986:189) that the three television networks "devoted a combined total of less than fifteen minutes to genocide in Cambodia", Herman (1986:191) responds by shifting the terms of debate: "'Genocide' is a highly invidious word. Adams contended in his article [i.e., Adams and Joblove 1982] that the networks were 'alerted' to ongoing genocide in Cambodia as early as June of 1975 by speeches of Kissinger and allegations of Freedom House. It apparently never occurs to Adams that these are highly dubious sources and that the airing of their assertions by the networks without corroborative evidence was questionable . . . ."

There is little to be gained by continuing this debate here. Those with a taste for radical polemics are urged to consult Herman's several articles and books (with Noam Chomsky) on the topic. For now, it must be left to the reader's judgment to determine whether the list of print materials cited by Herman constitutes "assiduous attention" to Cambodia and bears reference to the "sheer volume" of coverage. As far as television coverage is concerned, Herman never effectively disputes the Adams and Joblove findings of a marked lack of reports. Nor is it clear that most thoughtful people would find an American Secretary of State (and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize) to be a "highly dubious" source, whose public statements require "corroborative evidence" before they are reported to the American public. Finally, although Herman describes the claims of Kissinger and Freedom House as "allegations" and "assertions," he nevertheless endorses Khmer Rouge apologist Michael Vickery's (1984) highly sympathetic estimate of 750,000 deaths, "of which perhaps 300,000 were executions" (Herman 1986:190) and says of the Khmer Rouge takeover (1985:138): "Retribution killings, starvation, and disease followed during several years of disorganization, severe deprivation, and terror (see [Chomsky and Herman 1979])." For present purposes, suffice it to say nearly everyone agrees that, although we lack a precise body count, something very terrible happened in Cambodia in 1975-79, and that the amount of coverage of these events was far from massive.

2. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of grants from Virginia Commonwealth University, Illinois Bell and the University of Virginia.

TABLE 1: Total Coverage of Cambodia on Network Television, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Network	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes
ABC (n = 75)												
Total	50	108:00	6	18:10	2	3:00	11	19:30	6	13:40	75	162:20
Mayaguez only	23	64:20	2	12:20	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	76:40
All other stories	27	43:40	4	5:50	2	3:00	11	19:30	6	13:40	50	85:40
CBS (n = 92)												
Total	46	104:10	9	22:40	8	8:30	22	38:40	7	19:30	92	193:20
Mayaguez only	23	57:30	4	9:10	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	66:40
All other stories	23	46:40	5	13:30	8	8:30	22	38:40	7	19:30	65	126:50
NBC (n = 75)												
Total	45	103:10	2	3:00	5	5:10	16	22:20	7	23:20	75	157:00
Mayaguez only	21	57:20	2	3:00	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	60:20
All other stories	24	45:50	-	-	6	5:10	16	22:20	7	23:20	52	96:40
All networks (N = 242)												
Total	141	315:20	17	43:50	15	16:40	49	80:30	20	56:30	242	512:50
Mayaguez only	67	179:10	8	24:30	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	203:40
All other stories	74	136:10	9	19:20	15	16:40	49	80:30	20	56:30	167	309:10

TABLE 2: Amount of Cambodian Material in Network Television Coverage of Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Network/Amount	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes
ABC (n = 75)												
Total	50	108:00	6	18:10	2	3:00	11	13:40	6	13:40	75	162:20
Mention (<10%)	4	11:40	1	1:50	-	-	3	5:00	1	1:30	9	20:00
Theme (10-50%)	7	17:50	2	12:20	-	-	3	3:20	1	2:30	13	36:00
Focus (>50%)	39	78:30	3	4:00	2	3:00	5	11:10	4	9:40	53	106:20
CBS (n = 92)												
Total	46	104:10	9	22:40	8	8:30	22	38:40	7	19:30	92	193:30
Mention (<10%)	5	19:20	1	3:40	-	-	2	2:10	-	-	8	25:10
Theme (10-50%)	8	17:20	2	6:00	-	-	3	4:10	1	2:00	14	29:30
Focus (>50%)	33	67:30	6	13:00	8	8:30	17	32:20	6	17:30	70	138:50
NBC (n = 75)												
Total	45	103:10	2	3:00	5	5:10	16	22:20	7	23:20	75	157:00
Mention (<10%)	3	7:50	-	-	-	-	2	6:00	1	2:10	6	16:00
Theme (10-50%)	4	9:20	1	2:20	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	11:40
Focus (>50%)	38	86:00	1	0:40	5	5:10	14	16:20	6	21:10	64	129:20
All networks (N = 242)												
Total	141	315:20	17	43:50	15	16:40	49	80:30	20	56:30	242	512:50
Mention (<10%)	12	38:50	2	5:30	-	-	7	13:10	2	3:40	23	61:10
Theme (10-50%)	19	44:30	5	20:40	-	-	6	7:30	2	4:30	32	77:10
Focus (>50%)	110	232:00	10	17:40	15	16:40	36	59:50	16	48:20	187	374:30

TABLE 3: Focus of Network Television Coverage of Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79

Network/Focus	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1975-79
ABC (n = 75)						
Total stories	50	6	2	11	6	75
Internal affairs	28	4	2	10	6	50
Refugees	9	1	1	1	0	12
External issues	26	2	0	1	0	29
CBS (n = 92)						
Total stories	46	9	8	22	7	92
Internal affairs	35	4	8	19	7	73
Refugees	7	4	1	4	0	16
External issues	14	4	0	0	0	18
NBC (n = 75)						
Total stories	45	2	5	16	7	75
Internal affairs	21	0	5	16	6	48
Refugees	9	0	1	0	2	12
External issues	24	2	0	0	0	26
All networks (N = 242)						
Total stories	141	17	15	49	20	242
Internal affairs	84	8	15	45	19	171
Refugees	25	5	3	5	2	40
External issues	64	8	0	1	0	73

TABLE 4: Evaluative Tone of Network Television Stories about Cambodia, 4/16/75, N = 242

	1975				1976				1977				1978				1979				1975-79			
Network	+	-	±	0	+	-	±	0	+	-	±	0	+	-	±	0	+	-	±	0	+	-	±	0
ABC (n = 75)																								
Total	4	17	17	12	1	1	1	3	0	1	1	0	0	5	3	3	0	1	1	4	5	25	23	22
Mayaguez only	0	12	8	3	0	0	0	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	12	8	5
All other stories	4	5	9	9	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	5	3	3	0	1	1	4	5	13	15	17
CBS (n = 92)																								
Total	5	21	11	9	0	3	1	5	0	6	1	1	2	7	9	4	2	3	1	1	9	40	23	20
Mayaguez only	0	15	3	5	0	0	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	15	4	8
All other stories	5	6	8	4	0	3	0	2	0	6	1	1	2	7	9	4	2	3	1	1	9	25	19	12
NBC (n = 75)																								
Total	6	17	8	14	0	0	0	2	0	3	1	1	0	10	3	3	2	3	1	1	8	33	13	21
Mayaguez only	0	12	1	8	0	0	0	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	12	1	10
All other stories	6	5	7	6	-	-	-	-	0	3	1	1	0	10	3	3	2	3	1	1	8	21	12	11
All networks (N = 242)																								
Total	15	55	36	35	1	4	2	10	0	10	3	2	2	22	15	10	4	7	3	6	22	98	59	63
Mayaguez only	0	39	12	16	0	0	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	39	13	23
All other stories	15	16	24	19	1	4	1	3	0	10	3	2	2	22	15	10	4	7	3	6	22	59	46	40

TABLE 5: Content Themes in Network Television Stories about Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79

	1975				1976				1977				1978				1979				1975-79			
Theme	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All
Foreign affairs	19	18	14	51	0	2	0	2	1	3	2	6	4	9	6	19	6	5	6	17	30	37	28	95
Military affairs	37	35	31	103	2	1	0	3	2	5	3	10	9	16	11	36	6	7	7	20	56	64	52	172
Civil conflict	12	11	9	32	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	5	5	2	12	20	17	12	49
Foreign conflict	27	24	23	74	1	0	0	1	2	5	3	10	8	16	11	35	6	6	6	18	44	51	43	138
Routine activities	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4
Government & Politics	8	12	6	26	2	1	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	5	1	6	1	2	3	6	11	21	10	42
Law/Justice/Crime	5	7	9	21	1	2	0	3	0	3	2	5	1	8	4	13	1	2	3	6	8	22	18	48
Economy/Trade/Labor/Transport	5	4	2	11	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	3	7	0	0	1	1	7	7	7	21
Natural Resources/Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Food & Agriculture	4	1	4	9	1	1	0	2	0	1	2	3	1	4	0	5	0	0	1	1	6	7	7	20
Health	6	3	3	12	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	8	5	4	17
Education	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	5
Family/Community/Housing	6	5	5	16	1	1	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	3	2	5	0	0	2	2	7	9	11	27
Religion	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	5
History & Culture	3	7	1	11	4	6	2	12	0	1	1	2	1	9	5	15	1	2	4	7	9	25	13	47
Immigration/Emigration	10	8	13	31	1	4	0	5	1	2	1	4	0	5	0	5	1	1	4	6	13	20	18	51
Communications/Journalism	5	4	2	11	1	2	0	3	0	1	1	2	1	6	4	11	0	0	1	1	7	13	8	28
Science & Technology	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Accidents & Disasters	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Human interest	1	2	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	6
Other	2	2	4	8	1	2	0	3	0	1	1	2	4	6	6	16	2	1	1	4	9	12	12	33

TABLE 6: Cambodian Conflicts and Blame for Those Conflicts in Network Television Stories about Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79

	1975				1976				1977				1978				1979				1975-79			
Country	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All
Conflict with:																								
Cambodia (internal)	11	12	8	31	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	3	0	1	4	2	0	3	5	18	14	12	44
Vietnam	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	25	10	42	8	9	13	30	16	35	25	76
Laos	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	3	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	6	2	9	0	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	4	10	3	17
Unspecified neighbor	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
United States	30	24	22	76	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	24	22	77
Other non-neighbor	4	1	2	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	6	1	3	10
Blame attributed to:																								
Cambodia	14	11	11	36	1	1	0	2	1	7	2	10	3	8	3	14	1	0	9	10	20	27	25	72
Vietnam	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	6	3	4	0	7	4	7	3	14
Laos	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unspecified neighbor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	3	3	0	6	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	7
Other non-neighbor	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Neutral/Mixed/Unclear	32	25	22	79	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	17	8	32	6	5	7	18	45	47	38	130

TABLE 7: Network Television Coverage of Internal and External Human Rights Issues in Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, actual time

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Network	**#**	**minutes**	**#**	**minutes**	**#**	**minutes**	**#**	**minutes**	**#**	**minutes**	**#**	**minutes**
ABC (n = 75)												
Total	12	9:30	1	1:50	1	1:00	4	6:00	2	0:40	20	19:00
Internal	12	9:30	1	1:50	-	-	3	5:00	2	0:40	18	17:00
External	-	-	-	-	1	1:00	1	1:00	-	-	2	2:00
CBS (n = 92)												
Total	8	7:50	2	5:10	5	1:30	10	13:40	3	2:00	28	30:10
Internal	8	7:50	2	5:10	2	0:30	6	8:30	3	1:40*	21	23:40
External	-	-	-	-	3	1:00	4	5:10	1	0:20*	8	6:30
NBC (n = 75)												
Total	11	7:10	-	-	4	4:10	8	5:30	3	3:50	26	20:40
Internal	11	7:10	-	-	3	3:50*	7	4:30	3	3:50	24	19:10
External	-	-	-	-	2	0:30*	1	1:00	-	-	3	1:30
All networks (n = 242)												
Total	31	24:30	3	7:00	10	6:40	22	25:10	8	6:30	74	69:50
Internal	31	24:30	3	7:00	5	4:10*	16	18:00	8	6:10*	63	59:50
External	-	-	-	-	6	2:30*	6	7:10	1	0:20*	13	10:00

*One story dealt with both internal and external rights

TABLE 8: ABC News Coverage of Internal and External Human Rights Issues in Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, actual time

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Month	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes
January	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0:40		
February	X	X	-	-	1	1:00	1	1:00	X	X		
March	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
April	5	1:20	1	1:50	-	-	1	0:10	X	X		
May	4	5:40	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
June	1	0:10	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
July	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
August	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4:40	X	X		
September	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
October	1	1:30	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
November	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
December	1	0:50	-	-	-	-	1	0:10	X	X		
Totals	12	9:30	1	1:50	1	1:00	4	6:00	2	0:40	20	19:00

X = not included in study

TABLE 9: CBS News Coverage of Internal and External Human Rights Issues in Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, actual time

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Month	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes
January	X	X	1	2:30	1	0:40	3	4:00	3	2:00		
February	X	X	-	-	-	-	1	2:00	X	X		
March	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
April	3	1:20	-	-	-	-	2	5:40	X	X		
May	3	5:40	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
June	2	0:50	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
July	-	-	1	2:40	1	0:10	-	-	X	X		
August	-	-	-	-	1	0:10	2	1:20	X	X		
September	-	-	-	-	2	0:30	-	-	X	X		
October	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0:30	X	X		
November	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
December	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0:10	X	X		
Totals	8	7:50	2	5:10	5	1:30	10	13:40	3	2:00	28	30:10

X = not included in study

TABLE 10: NBC News Coverage of Internal and External Human Rights Issues in Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, actual time

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Month	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes
January	X	X	-	-	1	0:10	1	1:00	3	3:50		
February	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
March	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
April	3	0:30	-	-	1	0:40	2	0:40	X	X		
May	5	4:10	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
June	1	0:20	-	-	-	-	1	1:00	X	X		
July	2	2:10	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
August	-	-	-	-	2	3:20	2	0:30	X	X		
September	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2:00	X	X		
October	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
November	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
December	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0:20	X	X		
Totals	11	7:10	-	-	4	4:10	8	5:30	3	3:50	26	20:40

X = not included in study

TABLE 11: Network Television News Coverage of Internal and External Human Rights Issues in Cambodia 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, actual time

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79	
Month	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes	#	minutes
January	X	X	1	2:30	2	0:50	4	5:00	8	6:30		
February	X	X	-	-	1	1:00	2	3:00	X	X		
March	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
April	11	3:10	1	1:50	1	0:40	5	6:30	X	X		
May	12	15:30	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
June	4	1:20	-	-	-	-	1	1:00	X	X		
July	2	2:10	1	2:40	1	0:10	-	-	X	X		
August	-	-	-	-	3	3:30	5	6:30	X	X		
September	-	-	-	-	2	0:30	1	2:00	X	X		
October	1	1:30	-	-	-	-	1	0:30	X	X		
November	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X		
December	1	0:50	-	-	-	-	3	0:40	X	X		
Totals	31	24:30	3	7:00	10	6:40	22	25:10	8	6:30	74	69:50

X = not included in study

TABLE 12: Aspects of Human Rights Discussed in Network Television Coverage of Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, all mentions

UDHR Area	1975				1976				1977				1978				1979				1975-79			
	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All
Life	6	10	16	32	2	3	0	5	1	5	11	17	4	13	9	26	0	2	3	5	13	33	39	85
Slavery/Involuntary servitude	0	0	2	2	3	2	0	5	0	0	4	4	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	3	4	8	15
Torture/Cruel, degrading punishment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Equal protection/Personhood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Legal rights	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	3	1	2	0	3
Privacy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Movement/Residence	14	14	10	38	3	4	0	7	0	0	3	3	3	6	4	13	0	1	5	6	20	25	22	67
Asylum	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	2
Nationality	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Marriage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
Property ownership	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	6
Thought/Conscience/Religion	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	1	2	3
Opinion/Information	2	1	1	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	8
Peaceable assembly/Association	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	3
Aid in preserving rights	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Adequate standard of living	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	4
Adequate food	2	1	3	6	2	0	0	2	0	1	2	3	2	5	0	7	0	0	2	2	6	7	7	20
Adequate medical care	6	3	1	10	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	12
Adequate housing/Clothing	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
Education	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	6
Participation in cultural life	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unspecified rights reference	1	3	1	5	3	3	0	6	0	2	2	4	5	9	7	21	3	4	3	10	12	21	13	46

TABLE 13: Force and Valence of Human Rights Statements in Network Television Coverage of Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, all statements

	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1975-79		
Type of Statement	Assert	Suggest	Assert	Suggest	Assert	Suggest	Assert	Suggest	Assert	Suggest	Assert	Suggest	Total
ABC													
Violation claimed	10	6	4	0	1	0	5	2	3	1	23	9	32
Progress rebutted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violation rebutted	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
Progress claimed	9	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	4	13
CBS													
Violation claimed	8	11	6	1	4	2	23	8	5	3	46	25	71
Progress rebutted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violation rebutted	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	5
Progress claimed	1	2	0	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	5	3	8
NBC													
Violation claimed	10	8	0	0	8	1	16	1	11	1	45	11	56
Progress rebutted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violation rebutted	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
Progress claimed	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	3
All networks													
Violation claimed	28	25	10	1	13	3	44	11	19	5	114	45	159
Progress rebutted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violation rebutted	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	3	11
Progress claimed	10	6	0	1	0	1	4	2	0	0	14	10	24

TABLE 14: Sources of Comments about Human Rights on Network Television Coverage of Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, all mentions

	1975				1976				1977				1978				1979				1975-79			
Source	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All	ABC	CBS	NBC	All
Claim violation/Rebut progress																								
Refugee	2	6	2	10	1	5	0	6	1*	1	3	5	2	4	0	6	0	1	1	2	6	17	6	29
Cambodian government-Lon Nol	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Cambodian government-Khmer Rouge	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Cambodian government-other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	5	1	3	1	5
US government/Official	1	2	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	3	9	0	1	0	1	3	7	6	16
US citizen/Group	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Other government/Official	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	1*	1	0	2	1	5	0	6	0	0	1	1	4	7	1	12
Other citizen/Group	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	4	0	0	0	0	1	2	4	7
Journalist	9	7	11	27	3	1	0	4	0	3	5	8	2	15	5	22	3	3	8	14	17	29	29	75
Unspecified	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	3	5	0	0	1	1	1	4	5	10
Other	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Claim progress/Rebut violation																								
Refugee	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Cambodian government-LonNol	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodian government-Khmer Rouge	5	2	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	5	4	0	9
Cambodian government-other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
US Government/Official	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
US citizen/Group	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Other government/Official	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Other citizen/Group	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
Journalist	8	2	3	13	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	9	5	4	18
Unspecified/Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Multiple attribution

Table 15: Stories Using Cambodian Video in Network Television Coverage of Cambodia, 4/16/75 - 1/8/79, N = 242

Network/Video	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1975-79
ABC (n = 75)						
Cambodian video	7	1	0	0	2	10
No Cambodian video	43	5	2	11	4	65
CBS (n = 92)						
Cambodian video	4	3	1	2	2	12
No Cambodian video	42	6	7	20	5	80
NBC (n = 75)						
Cambodian video	5	0	2	3	2	12
No Cambodian video	40	2	3	13	5	63
All networks (N = 242)						
Cambodian video	16	4	3	5	6	34
No Cambodian video	125	13	12	44	14	208
All stories	141	17	15	49	20	242